

LAV – Housing Laboratory

LAV Informal Settlements and Migratory Phenomenon

Within the framework of the UHPH towards the implementation of Sustainable International Agendas: City

Management: Integration and prevention of slums + Attention to migratory flows

Housing and Infrastructure Financing: Financing strategies for the accessibility of social housing solutions

Concept Note

First Virtual Session: Wednesday, May 13, 2020

10.00 h to 13.00 h, Bogota time

Authors: Adriana Hurtado Tarazona, María Mercedes di Virgilio, Patricia Gryciuk. Contributing Authors: Margarita Greene, Ana Ruiz Neves, Hugo Banammon, Laura Ximena Rojas Calderón, Anaclaudia Rossbach.

Summary

This LAV seeks to contribute to the generation of prudent and timely results that allow rethinking housing policies and determining how to face the challenges and maximize the opportunities posed by the migratory phenomenon. In this way, its intention is to serve as a bridge to understand under what innovative, sustainable and effective public, regulatory and financial policy mechanisms should address the policy of informal settlements and housing with migratory flows as a regional block; within the framework of the Annual Assembly of Ministers of Housing and Urban Development of Latin America and the Caribbean (MINURVI₂). In this sense, it also seeks to explore experiences in the region that can contribute to the stock of knowledge on the issues addressed, to provide greater capacities through the integration and dialogue of different stakeholders with various approaches.

Key words

Informal settlements, migration, governance, urban planning, housing.

The Urban Housing Practitioners Hub-UHPH is an open platform for the exchange, meeting and dissemination of practices, knowledge and actors who work for housing and urban habitat in Latin America and the Caribbean. It combines the digital space with face-to-face interactions so that people who work in the sector can connect with each other and access information and practical solutions in real time. For more information, visit <https://www.uhph.org/es>
For more information, visit <https://www.minurvi.org/>

Context

MINURVI, under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Housing, City and Territory (MVCT) of Colombia, has requested the Executive Committee of the Urban Housing Practitioners Hub (UHPH) to develop and carry out a Housing Laboratory (LAV) in order to deepen issues related to the challenges posed by informal settlements and the migration phenomenon in the region's habitability policies, as well as how to address them, to contribute to awareness raising and knowledge sharing on joint regional actions for access to housing in MINURVI member countries.

In this context, MINURVI, as the main instance for political agreement, coordination and regional cooperation on housing issues and sustainable urban development; through the Declaration of the 27th Assembly held in San José - Costa Rica in 2019, describes the unplanned urban growth, which has been evident in the region for decades, as a social, economic, environmental, cultural and political condition, which compromises the quality of life, public health and the full exercise of human rights of millions of residents in the region. The foregoing affects mainly the population located in marginal neighborhoods and slums, where there is a large mass of migrants; Therefore, in accordance with the principles of the declaration, it is intended to promote joint regional action to face these challenges.


1 Contents

1.1 Introduction to the subject

“In a globalized world like ours, migration plays a central role in the processes of social reproduction. More specifically, migration is closely linked to the processes of demographic and economic reproduction, and of socioeconomic (class) stratification. The first is due to the fact that migration plays a central role in 'the complementarity of the dynamics of the population of the regions of origin with the dynamics in the countries of destination' (Canales, 2016, p. 22). The second, because it has a double effect on the reproduction of capital. On the one hand, as a process of transfer of workforce and human capital between contexts of origin and destination and, on the other, by originating flows of resources, especially remittances, often essential for the social reproduction of families, by definition, transnationals and their communities of origin. Finally, migration is an important factor in the social reproduction of social differences and inequalities in countries of origin and destination. In the former, a dependency arises with the labor and economic dynamics of the arrival contexts. In the latter, the work of migrants tends to be concentrated in activities linked to the social and daily reproduction of the native population, for example, through domestic and care work” (CEPAL, 2018: 9).

As documented by the United Nations (UN, 2019), currently, 3.5% of the world population are international migrants, reaching the highest figures since records are counted.

Migrations constitute a phenomenon widely studied from different perspectives and approaches. However, as a recent work by ECLAC (2018) suggests, little has been explored and reflected on its relationships with social protection, in general, and the provision of housing, in particular. In 2015, the New York Declaration and the development of the two Global Covenants have urged both, nations and cities, to focus efforts on addressing the movement of people in diverse contexts. States recognize that cities are strongly impacted by migratory flows (see Diagram 1). The impacts are multiple, attending to social, spatial and urban issues. In this way, guaranteeing an adequate reception, management and integration of migrants is essential for the provision of fairer and more equitable urban ecosystems, with the capacity to provide opportunities to both locals and migrants.³



Source: ECLAC (2018)

In recent years, Latin America and the Caribbean has been significantly affected by migratory flows promoted as a result of economic factors, political crises, violence, disasters, among others. Such movements have had severe impacts, especially in urban territories characterized by poverty and informality, by lack of access to basic utility systems and the labor market. In addition, the social and cultural dynamics of various countries are experiencing processes of change at both the political and social levels, generating tensions between locals and migrants.

In order to better understand the nature of the phenomenon and its impacts, it seems necessary to segment and characterize the types of migratory flows, understanding that behind the migratory phenomenon there are very dissimilar situations that affect both cities -whether of origin or host cities in very different ways. of migrants - as well as the migrants themselves. As Edwards and Greene (2020) point out, the migratory

³ Based on the Report and Conclusions of the working table "Strengthening alliances to improve the local migration response in Latin America and the Caribbean", within the framework of the 6th Forum of Mayors in Quito, Ecuador, on January 22, 2020, which was part of the agenda of the XII Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) that took place from January 20 to 24.

phenomenon refers to any population movement that encompasses different types of movements of people. Thus, flows can be classified following different criteria. One of these criteria refers to the nature of the phenomenon: forced and unforced movements. Likewise, they can be segmented according to their status: internal migration, international migration, emigration and seasonal population.

Non-forced migrations, in general, respond to the search for a potential improvement of their livelihoods. On the contrary, forced migration flows include both (i) internally displaced persons (IDPs), who are *"forced to flee or abandon their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflicts, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, and that have not crossed an internationally recognized state border"*, such as (ii) refugees, that is *"a person [persons/people] who is [are] outside their country of nationality or habitual residence; has [have] a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, being the member of a particular social group or political opinions, cannot or does [do] not want to avail themselves of the protection of that country, or return there, for fear of persecution"*(UNHCR, 2016).

Forced displacement in Mexico

The Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights (CMDPDH) has documented that, from 2006 to 2017, 329,917 people have been victims of massive internal forced displacement⁴. Its 2017 report describes that, during that year, there were 25 episodes of internal forced displacement, all of them with the presence of and/or the direct use of violence, in the states of Chiapas, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, Guerrero, Michoacán, Oaxaca, Sinaloa and Zacatecas. The causes of these episodes were violence generated by organized armed groups, political violence, social unrest, territorial conflicts and an extractive mining project that, together, affected a total of 20,390

people, of which 60% were indigenous populations. The other way in which this occurs, is individual or drop-by-drop internal displacement, which involves small family units leaving their community. These types of displacements are the most common, but because they occur in isolation, they are usually invisible and are not recorded.

Although there are still no specific statistics that allow a clear overview of this phenomenon. However, the National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Safety (ENVIPE) asks if, in order to protect themselves against crime, measures were adopted in the household, such as changing homes or place of residence, to which 315,330 units would have responded "yes" in the course of 2017. The State of Mexico, Jalisco, Veracruz, Mexico City, Puebla, Michoacán, Baja California, Guanajuato, Chihuahua, Quintana Roo and Querétaro are the states where currently more than 10,000 insecurity-related displaced households are settled⁵.

⁴ Mass displacement episodes involve the simultaneous mobilization of ten or more family units for the same cause, and tend to take place after an attack directed at the inhabitants of a community.

⁵ The survey does not record the town where the households came from, so it is not possible to know whether it is intra-municipal, intra-state or interstate displacement.

According to the special report on internal forced displacement in Mexico, the National Housing Commission (CONAVI) does not have specific mechanisms to facilitate direct access to housing programs for the displaced population, although it has the powers to attend to directly to people who are victims of internal forced displacement, without the need to modify their current functions or skills.

Source: Migration Program, Cities Alliance (2019)

One example of the challenges that several cities in the region face today is the consequences of Venezuelan migration, which already amounts to more than 4 million migrants/refugees, most of whom are hosted by Latin American countries.

Emigration as an experience: The case of Venezuela

According to data from the World Bank and the United Nations Global Migration Database, between 2005 and 2010, the number of Venezuelans living abroad in recent decades has grown significantly, going from 378,000 to 521,000 (Freitez, 2011). Where are these migrants headed within the region? The countries in the region with the largest relative increases in the number of Venezuelans are, in order of importance, Panama - which in one decade has multiplied by more than six times the total number of Venezuelan residents - Colombia, Mexico, Costa Rica and Argentina.

The advantages of being a neighboring country and the potential job opportunities explain the intense increase observed in Panama and Colombia. The probable existence of networks could explain emigration to other countries. Flows to the United States, Canada, and Spain showed moderate to high increases.

Currently, the political and socio-economic situation that the country is going through led to three million people leaving Venezuela, and not only neighboring countries were the chosen destinations, but also other more distant Latin American nations. The exodus of Venezuelans is classified as the largest in the modern history of Latin America and the Caribbean, and involves both refugees and migrants. According to official government figures, the number of Venezuelans in Latin American countries increased from 700,000 in 2015, to more than three million in November 2018. However, international organizations estimate that the amount is higher, since most statistical sources do not take into account Venezuelans in an irregular situation. The International Migrations Organization (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees -UNHCR- (R4V, 2019) estimate that, as of March 2019, the total number of refugees and migrants could amount to 3.7 million. The bulk of this population is concentrated in Colombia and Peru (32.4% and 19.7%, respectively).

Colombia, since it shares borders with Venezuela, is one of the countries where Venezuelan migrants arrive more easily. It is estimated that, until December 2019, more than one million seven hundred immigrants of Venezuelan origin were based in Colombia,

of which -according to Colombian Migration- around a million did not have a regular status. This migration process has had a relevant impact on the Colombian health system, the labor market and the demand for housing, among others. But one of the most important and far-reaching effects is security, since border areas are the main areas affected by the arrival of a large number of people who arrive in conditions of great vulnerability (López Díaz, 2019).


Likewise, it is estimated that more than 800,000 Venezuelans reside in Peru, most of them of working age and with an educational level higher than the average of the Peruvian population. Lima is the chosen settlement center.

Source: Document Annex

The migratory wave has settled mainly in Colombia, which hosts around 1.4 million, followed by Peru with 860,900, Ecuador 330,400, Chile 288,200, Brazil 178,600 and Argentina 145,000, in figures as of September 2019⁷. Likewise, the policies implemented in recent years in the United States have meant a considerable increase in the numbers of returnees to Latin American countries, especially Mexico and Guatemala, also unleashing several crises in transit cities in Central America.

Despite this, it should be noted that these migratory flows represent an opportunity for host cities, due to the arrival of qualified human capital at different levels, with the capacity to contribute widely to local labor markets both through access to jobs where they can share their experiences, as well as improving skills in various trades. Added to this, is the integration of professionals who are in a position to contribute to the economic development of these cities. In addition, the flow of remittances that circulates in various countries of the region currently represents a great opportunity to capitalize on initiatives that may have multiplier effects on local economies, through the collaboration of various sectors.

In this framework, the opportunities of these migration flows must be adequately capitalized through structured governance mechanisms that promote dialogue not only at the level of government and financial institutions, but also with a strong social component that can focus efforts on a effective integration of migrants and/or returnees to various contexts safely both in the medium and long term. In this sense, international organizations could play a key role in developing these mechanisms and in leveraging their systematization and institutionalization, in collaboration with various levels of government, considering a close alliance with local governments and grassroots organizations for strengthening of their roles when addressing the issue. The support of international organizations on this issue becomes even more important in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, which also has a strong impact on the migration phenomenon.



COVID-19 and Returnees: The case of the Guatemalan migrant community

The COVID-19 pandemic in the US has strongly impacted the Guatemalan migrant community in irregular status. The first effects of this health emergency range from the loss of jobs to the difficulty in accessing health services, as well as with the fear of being detained and deported by the US authorities. This context will undoubtedly affect the economy of migrants. In addition, it will affect families that depend on the remittances that migrants send to Guatemala. It is expected that, if this situation continues as it has been in the last three months, the reduction in remittances will be 20% compared to 2019.

Given the economic uncertainty and the tightening of control measures in the northern countries, it is expected that the number of deported people will increase, and others will be forced to return to their country due to the existing adverse conditions and insecurity in the United States, where Hispanics are one of the most vulnerable groups and that have been affected by the lack of access to emergency and healthcare services.

In Guatemala, the situation has not been very different with the migrants returned to the country, since many of them were exposed to the contagion of the disease in the detention centers. As a result, flights from the US were stopped and spaces were managed to send returnees to quarantine and rule out positive cases. Those confirmed were sent to emergency hospitals that treat cases of COVID-19.

Despite this, attention to returnees has been deficient in both discourse and actions. As a result of this situation, one of the consequences has been the stigmatization of returnees as carriers of the virus. This puts them in a situation of risk and social vulnerability, since there are already some precedents of actions of rejection, persecution and violence against people who have returned to their communities of origin.

Currently, one of the demands of the Guatemalan government to the U.S. authorities is that COVID-19 tests be carried out before sending migrants back to the country. Although the arrival of planes with hundreds of deportees was interrupted for a couple of weeks, it has recently been announced that they will resume shortly. Meanwhile, internally, the demand to the Guatemalan government is to improve the conditions of the returned migrants who are housed and quarantined in order to prevent Covid-19.

The deportation data for the first quarter of 2020 indicates that for January there were 4,171 Guatemalans deported from the United States, a figure that broke the record for the same month in 2019. However, in March 2020, when the pandemic had been declared worldwide, the number of deportees fell to 2,938 people, 34% less than in the previous month.

Source: Document Annex

1.2 Experiences in Latin America

Below are examples of how different countries and cities in Latin America have responded from the policy of precarious settlements to the migratory flows that each one faces. The Annex contains more detailed facts sheets on the different countries, specifying the types of migration present in each one of them,

its impact on slums, policies, and the legal and rights frameworks that underpin these responses.

Brazil - Sao Paulo | Municipal Policy for Immigrant Population - Municipality of Sao Paulo

Within the framework of the articulation of the Housing Policy with the immigration issue, on July 7, 2016, Municipal Law 16,478 was enacted, which establishes the Municipal Policy for the Immigrant Population, and establishes its objectives, principles, guidelines and priority actions, and creates the Municipal Council of Immigrants. The Law is the first in the country to establish guidelines for immigration policy at the municipal level, and defines the migrant population as "all persons who move from their usual place of residence in another country to Brazil, including labor immigrants, students, people in refugee situations, stateless persons, as well as their families, regardless of their immigration and permission status." The Municipal Council of Immigrants (CMI) established by law is an advisory body composed of 32 councilors, representatives of the public power and civil society, whose objective is to participate in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Municipal Policy for the Immigrant population.

This legal framework is the umbrella for institutional arrangements that include support services, governance mechanisms and articulation with housing programs.

The response on housing issues for migrants in São Paulo consists of an articulation of programs from various spheres of government. In the first place, subsidies for new homes for acquisition are used, via the Minha Casa, Minha Vida Program. In addition, there are three municipal programs: (i) the Social Rental Program, which offers affordable housing units for the low-income population; (ii) the Pode Entrar Program, focused on the creation of incentive mechanisms for the construction of popular housing units; and (iii) Auxílio Vivienda, which provides a financial benefit complementary to family income, to help the family cover housing expenses.

It is important to highlight that the national legal framework in Brazil is very advanced. Law 13,445/17 establishes the rights and duties of migrants and visitors, regulates their entry and stay in the country, establishes principles and guidelines for public policies for migrants, and guarantees equal and free access to services for migrants. and programs and social benefits, public goods, education, comprehensive public legal assistance, work, housing, banking and social security.

Chile - National Scale | Regulatory adjustments for the access of the migrant population to Housing and Rent Programs - Ministry of Housing and Urbanism

In recent years, the MINVU has implemented various actions and measures to break down and make more flexible the access barriers of the foreign population to the Ministry's programs. The modifications made in the housing area are summarized in the following: (1) The requirement of certifying the 5 years of the definitive permanence was eliminated, requesting at the moment only to accredit definitive permanence, this, for application to the housing without debt (D.S. N°49) and housing with debt (D.S. N°01). (2)

The definitive permanence requirement was replaced by only the requirement of

a national identity card for foreigners, to apply for the rental subsidy (DS N ° 52). (3) Resolutions establishing the provision of technical, legal and social assistance services for the debt-free housing programs (DS No. 49) and the rural habitability program (DS No. 10) were drawn up. These include the cultural relevance of families and groups, to guarantee the proper development of the Technical Assistance Services and the activities associated with them.

Likewise, the modifications made in the neighborhood and city level, although they are not normative, are changes in the work methodology that allow the implementation of the programs with a more inclusive approach. At the neighborhood and city level, intervention methodologies have been developed to incorporate the migrant condition from the design of interventions with an intercultural approach. The Neighborhood Recovery Program, for example: incorporates from the application file an analysis of the population with a focus on inclusion. This makes it possible to identify situations of inclusion-exclusion of the migrant population that should be considered. Based on the information and analysis of the shared diagnosis, where appropriate, explicit work is done with this approach. In this way, and taking into account the analysis of the territory, its characteristics, potentialities and opportunities, pertinent projects are planned and executed for the inhabitants of the neighborhood. In this sense, it is incorporated into the three stages of the program: design, execution and evaluation (MINVU, 2020).

Colombia - National Scale Housing Subsidies for Displaced and Returned Populations

Currently, the country faces a double migratory flow: internal due to forced displacement due to the armed conflict, external due to the arrival of migrants from Venezuela. Many of these households have come to live in slums on the outskirts of cities or to rent rooms in central areas. Faced with this situation, the National Government has faced it in a different way. Following the constitutional mandate to guarantee the right to a dignifying housing for all Colombians (Article 51, Political Constitution of Colombia, 1991), the National Government has prioritized households victims of forced displacement in the free housing programs of the National Government (Decree 2231 of 2017) and included a rental subsidy for the displaced population (Decree 1077 of 2015). These initiatives are part of the Road of Attention, Assistance and Comprehensive Reparation to the Victims of the Armed Conflict.

Faced with external migration, the policy response is still incipient. There are mechanisms for humanitarian care for the migrant population through attention centers, and initiatives for health and education services. However, in the case of housing there are still no consolidated initiatives beyond temporary shelters. Despite this, there are mechanisms for the inclusion of returnee households (Colombians who migrated to Venezuela in past decades) in accessing housing subsidies from the national government to provide housing solutions in the border area (Decree 1819 of 2015).

Guatemala - Amatitlán and San Marcos | JWP Cities and Migration - Cities Alliance

Within the framework of its Joint Cities and Migration Work Program, Cities Alliance, with support from the Swiss Cooperation for Development, is beginning the implementation of the Latin America chapter, focused on supporting two secondary cities in Guatemala, Amatitlán and San Marcos, with diverse labor migration dynamics.

"Amatitlán te Incluye" - Focus on Governance, with local support from the Avina Foundation: as part of the metropolitan area of Guatemala City, Amatitlán is a recipient of returnees, especially those who have returned to the country after various periods of stay in the United States. In this context, the background of the efforts made in the framework of the "Guate te Incluye" Project has shown encouraging results for the social and labor inclusion of migrants returned to the country, through the agreement of a work commission that seeks to unite the efforts of the various state institutions, civil society, private sector, among others, which has supported in giving support to newcomers, strengthening and certifying capacities, among other multisectoral initiatives. In this way, and in close coordination with local authorities, "Amatitlán te incluye" will focus its efforts on supporting the development of governance mechanisms for capacity building for the design and implementation of local public policies that can effectively support the reception, management and integration of labor migrants.

"Prosperando en San Marcos" - Focus on Economic Development, with local support from the Inter-American Dialogue: as a city of transit and source of migrants, this city is the second largest recipient of remittances from migrants living abroad, after Guatemala City. The project focuses on financial inclusion, access to credit and the construction of human capital to take advantage of the resources that circulate in said territory, and that are currently used for consumption.

Mexico - National Scale | Housing Program for Migrants "Construye en tu Tierra"

In 2017, the Government of the Mexico announced the launch of the "Construye en tu tierra: Migrant housing program", through the method of self-production of housing on their own land, with which it supports nationals who live in the United States to have their own houses in Mexico. This year, it was planned to grant 5,000 subsidies through 16 Mexican consulates in the U.S.A. so that migrants who send remittances to their families in the country of origin would have the possibility of building their homes on their own land.

2 Guiding questions

Guiding questions are responsible for encouraging dialogue, seeking to delve into the issues presented in this Concept Note by addressing key issues that require special attention in order to pose viable alternatives in a reflective and focused framework.

1. What are the main migratory trends in Latin America and the Caribbean and what impacts do these recent flows have for the municipalities of departure/out-migration, transit and reception?
2. What are the implications of migration for informal settlements and/or homeless population?
3. How to better incorporate migratory dynamics into local urban and housing policies?
4. What are the existing regulatory frameworks for rights? Do -and how- they need to be adapted to the current needs of the migratory phenomenon?
5. What is the role of national urban policy? What is the role of the national government and housing policy?
6. Are there -and what are- concrete incentives for the adequate reception, management and integration of migrants at the local level? Which and how can incentives to local governments leverage actions for the reception, handling and more adequate integration of migrants in their various segmentations?

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
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4 Annexes. Documents by country

Brazil - Sao Paulo

Types of Migration Flows

According to data from the Federal Police (June 2019), there are 361,201 international migrants in the city of Sao Paulo (with a regular status; there is no information about



migrants with irregular status). According to data from an internal mapping of the Municipality in 2018, there were at least 29 urban occupations in downtown Sao Paulo with the presence of migrants. Migrant housing in São Paulo is affected by processes of socio-spatial segregation, with strong growth of migrants in the outskirts; lack of access

to formal rental contracts, due to the lack of support networks of people who serve as guarantors, or due to abuse or discrimination against migrants; and lack of access to housing policies, due to the lack of recognition of migrant documentation or lack of access to information for the migrant population.

Policy Responses

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The definition of the immigrant population in this Municipal Policy is: "all persons who move from their usual place of residence in another country to Brazil, including labor immigrants, students, people in refugee situations, stateless persons, as well as their families, regardless of their immigration and permission status."

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
There are also initiatives managed by migrants in São Paulo: CRAI is a specialized service made by migrants to provide guidance for migrants on public rights and policies; and also offers a Portuguese course for adult migrants in municipal schools through three free modules.

The Municipal Council of Immigrants (CMI) established by law is an advisory body composed of 32 councilors (16 members and 16 alternates), representatives of the public power and civil society, whose objective is to participate in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Municipal Policy for the Immigrant population. The CMI is comprised equally between representatives from the public powers and the civil society: eight municipal secretariats and eight members of the civil society. These members are elected from three categories: (i) collectives, associations and immigrant organizations; (ii) collectives, associations and

organizations that support immigrants and (iii) individual immigrants. The ordinary meetings are held monthly.

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Colombia

Types of Migration Flows

Slum areas in Colombia have been the product of migration flows since their initial formation, due to city field migrations that were common in several Latin American countries. However, throughout the twentieth century and to this day, in Colombia, migrants that are seeking economic opportunities in cities were joined by those forcefully displaced due to the armed conflict. Internal migration due to forced displacement currently totals 5.8 million people, almost 10% of the country's total population (IDB, 2020).

More recently, the country that had so far been primarily an out-migration has begun to receive a migration in-flow from other countries, mainly from Venezuela (78% of external migration in Colombia). As of 2018, approximately 1,235,593 people had been admitted with intent to stay from Venezuela to Colombia, of whom approximately 300 thousand are returned households, i.e. Colombians who had emigrated to Venezuela in previous decades. Of the remaining households, 468 thousand have regular migration status, 362 thousand are in the process of regularization and 105 thousand have irregular status. Of the total households that have migrated to Colombia, half live in poverty (Figures taken from the World Bank, 2018).

Impact on slum areas

Both migrant flows have increased the population living in slum areas on the outskirts of large and intermediate cities in the country - according to figures from the Ministry of Housing, in Colombia currently 1.3 million households live in precarious settlements - to informally renting rooms in central areas ("pagadarios") or to become occupants of public space or homeless. Colombia does not yet have a national policy that addresses slum areas (it is currently being drafted), and in recent decades housing policy has been aimed almost exclusively at subsidizing homes for the purchase of new housing, aiming to solve the quantitative (not qualitative) deficit. In this regard, there are guidelines for a public policy of comprehensive improvement (CONPES 3604 of 2009), which includes procedures and instruments for the regularization of settlements, legalization of titles, and the provision of basic infrastructure, mainly water and sanitation, and regulations for the urban legalization of informal settlements compiled in a Single Regulatory Decree of the Housing, City and Territory Sector (Decree 1077 of 2015). The national government is currently working on guidelines for slums and human settlements, developing the component "Dignified and inclusive housing and environments " of the National Development Plan (PND) 2018 - 2022.

In short, Colombian cities receive a double flow of migration (internal and external) when they do not have sufficient mechanisms to address the problem of slum areas, even for

the non-migrant population.


Policy Responses

Faced with this double migration (foreign and domestic), the National Government has addressed the situation in a different way. Per the constitution, all Colombians have the right to dignifying housing, and the State will set the conditions for making this right effective (Article 51, Political Constitution of Colombia, 1991). This constitutional principle has given rise to the prioritization of forced-displaced households in the National Government's free housing programs (Decree 2231 of 2017) and the eligibility to obtain a rental subsidy for the displaced population (Decree 1077 of 2015). These initiatives are part of the Road of Attention, Assistance and Comprehensive Reparation to the Victims of the Armed Conflict.

However, faced with foreign migration, the policy response is still incipient. There are mechanisms for humanitarian care for the migrant population through attention centers, and initiatives for health and education services. However, in the case of housing there are still no consolidated initiatives beyond temporary shelters. Although there is a policy bill recognizing the need to offer housing alternatives to migrants as temporary rent subsidies (CONPES 3950 2018), to date there are only mechanisms for the inclusion of returned households in access to housing subsidies from the national government to provide housing solutions in the border area (Decree 1819 of 2015).

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Some Migration Characteristics in Guatemala

Guatemala's migration situation is quite complex and includes internal and external modalities. As for internal migration, the urbanization process in Guatemala is just beginning. Currently 52% of the country's population lives in urban areas. With an annual urban growth rate of 3.3% mainly derived from domestic migration (country-city), it is estimated that the country can reach 75% of the urban population by 2032, leading to the arrival of more than 6 million inhabitants in the main urban centers.

As for external migration, while this is evident since the 1980s, in recent years it has intensified significantly, including transit migration and return migration. According to United Nations data and Inter-American Dialogue (2019), there are 2.8 million Guatemalans living abroad, approximately 16% of the current population. In addition, 5% of the country's resident population has moved domestically over the past 5 years, mainly from rural areas to urban areas with greater economic movement.

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the majority of Guatemalan migrants (91.1%) moved for financial reasons. Among the causes are: job search (56.8%), to improve their income (32.9%), to purchase a home (1.2%), and to start a business (0.1%). Unlike other countries in the region, Guatemala's migration dynamics to the United States are more motivated by economic opportunity than by issues of violence (0.3% of respondents migrated because of violence; 0.2% for extortion; and 0.2% for gang problems, according to that same survey).

On the other hand, there is domestic migration as a result of the displacement of inhabitants from smaller agricultural communities to larger cities, which can somehow provide better conditions for livelihoods. These flows reflect various challenges, such as the availability of adequate jobs, decent and affordable housing, educational institutions and health services, particularly when these and other basic services are in high demand in the cities of destination, causing greater pressure on local governments and their ability to accommodate a larger number of inhabitants, as well as the resulting irregular international migration that carries direct risks to the physical integrity of migrants.

COVID-19 and returnees

The COVID-19 pandemic in the US has strongly impacted the irregular Guatemalan migrant community, being the first effects of this health emergency ranging from job losses to difficulty accessing health services, as well as the fear of being detained and deported by US authorities.

All of these variables will undoubtedly affect the economy of migrants, but even more so; families who depend on the remittances they send to Guatemala. It is expected that,

if this situation continues as it has been in the last three months, the reduction in remittances will be of 20% compared to 2019.

Given economic uncertainty and the tightening of control measures in northern countries, the number of deportees is expected to increase. Others will be forced to return to the country in the face of adverse conditions and insecurity in the United States as the epicenter of the pandemic, and where Hispanics are one of the most vulnerable groups that have been affected by lack of access to emergency services and health care. Most migrants lack health insurance or other benefits such as "Medicare," which means, even under credit, the high-figure payment that a migrant cannot afford.

In Guatemala, the situation has not been very different with the migrants returned to the country, since many of them were exposed to the contagion of the disease in the detention centers. This warranted preventive measures to stop flights from the US and manage spaces and infrastructure to quarantine and rule out positive cases. Those confirmed were sent to emergency hospitals that treat cases of COVID-19.

As a result of this situation, one of the consequences has been to stigmatize returning migrants from being carriers of the virus, which puts them in a situation of risk and social vulnerability. There are already some precedents for actions of rejection, persecution and violence against people who have returned to their home communities, where conflicts have arisen that have attacked the lives and rights of returnees.

Currently, one of the demands of the Guatemalan government to the U.S. authorities is that COVID-19 tests be carried out before sending migrants back to the country. Although the arrival of planes with hundreds of deportees was interrupted for a couple of weeks, it has recently been announced that they will resume shortly. Meanwhile, internally, the demand to the Guatemalan government is to improve the conditions of the returned migrants who are housed and quarantined in order to prevent Covid-19.

The deportation data for the first quarter of 2020 indicates that for January there were 4,171 Guatemalans deported from the United States, a figure that broke the record for the same month in 2019. However, in March 2020, after the pandemic was declared to be worldwide, the number of deportees fell to 2,938 people, 34% less than in February 2020, which shows an atypical behavior according to the trend of how the year began.

Situation of slum areas and migration in Guatemala

Housing access is still one of the greatest challenges in Guatemala. The allocation of subsidies to the poorest families does not amount to more than 3,000 units per year, an incipient result to attack the structural problem of the housing deficit, which grows in demand by some 15,000 houses per year, according to data from the National Housing Council. On the market side, there are signs of interest in financing and building social interest housing, particularly in the municipality of Guatemala, partly due to a relaxation of land-use planning and non-fiscal incentives for housing in this segment. But the dynamics are just beginning, confined to that territory.

With respect to the qualitative deficit, the 2018 National Census of Population and Housing indicates that only 58.9% of homes have access to human-consumption water with piping inside the home; only 64.7% of households were made out of brick, block or concrete walls; and only 39.7% of households have cement flooring.

With a population of more than 3.5 million inhabitants (25% of the country's total population), the Metropolitan Area of the Guatemala Valley (AMG) is currently the most important urban concentration in Central America and continues to grow at a very high rate. Municipalities that make up the metropolitan area face a number of challenges in terms of urban development, including: (i) the rapid formation of informal and precarious settlements/slums resulting from migration processes, (ii) low coverage of basic services and utilities for most urban migrants, (iii) a high proportion of the migrant population living on steep slopes prone to natural disasters, (iv) high levels of road congestion, pollution and spatial segregation between work and housing, and (v) increased criminal activities and violence in some areas of the city. In Guatemala, the slum areas phenomenon is concentrated in the metropolitan area.

In 2015, the Techo organization conducted a settlement census with the aim of identifying, characterizing and georeference the informal settlements of the municipalities of Guatemala, Mixco, Chinautla, San Miguel Petapa and Villa Nueva. Overall, the study found that nearly 400,000 people resided in 418 settlements, 5% of them located in risky areas. According to this study, most of the existing slums were formed in the 1990s. While the phenomenon of migration to the capital city has existed since the 1950s and was exacerbated after the 1976 earthquake, most of the initial settlements have been formalized, gradually having access to services and legalization of their legal status.

In terms of migration, the Techo study showed that the new families that integrate into the settlements come from areas within the same municipality: San Miguel Petapa (38%), Mixco (50%), Chinautla (38%), Villa Nueva (31%) Guatemala (41%). The results of the study confirm that the time of further migration to settlements is consistent with the timing of their foundation, with a provenance that can be 30% from other departments.

Finally, the Techo study aims to show that, as indicated by the community leaders surveyed, remittances do not appear to be a significant source of resources for the inhabitants of these settlements. Only half of the settlements surveyed indicated that there were families receiving remittances from abroad.

Policy Responses

National Policy for Comprehensive Neighborhood Improvement (PMIB)

The case of Guatemala is interesting in terms of the prospect of comprehensive neighborhood improvement programs. Based on the experiences of the programs to combat urban poverty that were developed in the past decade and thanks to the institutional and organizational memory related to these processes, during 2018 and 2019, society stakeholders (public and private sectors, universities and NGOs) have come together to structure, within the framework of the National Housing Council - CONAVI - and with the technical assistance of the World Bank and other specialized agencies (including CABEI and Cities Alliance), a proposal to address the integrated management of neighborhoods. The draft of the National Policy for Comprehensive Neighborhood Improvement (PMIB)

approved in 2019 has been a participatory process that has involved different bodies both technically and politically, an effort that has been coordinated by the Vice-Ministry of Housing. The objective of this policy is to influence the decline in the precariousness of settlements in urban environments and to improve the quality of life of the population residing there. The fulfilment of this objective will result in greater equity and territorial cohesion in cities, expressed in situations such as: lower housing deficit, reduced poverty, insecurity and the number of crimes, among others (Urban Proposal, 2020).

PMIB is articulated around five thematic axes that seek to: 1) Reduce the vulnerability associated with environmental management, 2) Urban settlement consolidation, 3) Efficient social programs, 4) Capacity building for peaceful coexistence, participation and security, and 5) State strengthening for governance in slum areas. The implementation of the actions of the PMIB comes from the production of specific information on the risk conditions of each settlement to be intervened and results in reducing the vulnerability of the slums associated with inadequate environmental management (Propuesta Urbana, 2020).

To ensure the sustainability of implementation, the policy sets out the basic agreements on the institutional platform to be implemented by the policy, inter-agency coordination mechanisms and related sectoral competences. Three management strategies were also defined: (i) Implementation strategy; (ii) Financing strategy and (iii) the PMIB Monitoring and Evaluation System, with the definition of prioritization criteria, clear targets and sources of funding. Preliminary estimates show a need for at least \$1 billion to solve the problem of slums in the country in the next 15 years, which means a strong and sustained commitment to be maintained over time (Propuesta Urbana, 2020).

Cities and Migration Joint Work Program, Cities Alliance

Within the framework of its Joint Cities and Migration Work Program (JPW), Cities Alliance, with support from the Swiss Cooperation for Development (SDC), is beginning the implementation of the Latin America chapter, focused on supporting two secondary cities in Guatemala, Amatitlán and San Marcos, with diverse labor migration dynamics.

"Amatitlán te Incluye" - Focus on Governance, with local support from the AVINA Foundation: as part of the metropolitan area of Guatemala City, Amatitlán is a recipient of returnees, especially those who have returned to the country after various periods of stay in the United States. In this context, the background of the efforts made in the framework of the "Guate te Incluye" (Haefner, 2018) Project has shown encouraging results for the social and labor inclusion of migrants returned to the country, through the agreement of a work commission that seeks to unite the efforts of the various state institutions, civil society, private sector, among others, which has supported in giving support to newcomers, strengthening and certifying capacities, among other cross-sectional initiatives. In this way, and in close coordination with local authorities, "Amatitlán te incluye" will focus its efforts on supporting the development of governance mechanisms for capacity building for the design and implementation of local public policies that can effectively support the reception, management and integration of labor migrants.

"Prosperando en San Marcos" - Focus on Economic Development, with local support from the Inter-American Dialogue: as a city of transit and out-migration, this city is the second largest recipient of remittances from migrants living abroad, after Guatemala City; for this reason, the project focuses on financial inclusion, access to credit and building human capital to take advantage of the resources circulating in that

territory, and that nowadays are destined to consumption. This, within the framework of joint efforts from local authorities and other stakeholders (Diálogo Interamericano, 2019).

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| Types of Migration Flows | ai ti |
| Haiti is considered one of the territories in Latin America most affected by natural disasters, in addition to the existing poverty; the 2010 earthquake, Hurricane Matthew in 2016 and Stewart in 2017, were followed by large outbreaks of cholera. All of these events led to a humanitarian crisis that incentivized and increased international migrations already underway in the country, Haitian migration is now understood as a survival migration. | |

Globally, the countries/regions with the highest number of Haitians are the United States, Canada, France, the Dominican Republic, Cuba and South America. (Nieto, 2014). Studies on this migration to different countries in the region agree that, since the 2010 earthquake, a new migration flow to South America, mainly Brazil, followed by Chile and, to a lesser extent, Argentina, is gaining momentum. At the same time, Ecuador and Peru are considered as the countries with the highest transit of Haitians in the region, although also, more recently, Ecuador has been appointed as a “destination” (Cárdenas, 2015).

The emigration of Haitian citizens is not a recent phenomenon. The difficult living conditions that have prevailed in the Caribbean country for many decades have stimulated family or individual decisions aimed at moving to other countries in search of a better future (Nieto, 2014). This is how it has experienced a relative increase of around 400% in the number of nationals living outside its territory. About 10% of Haitians reside outside their nation (2010) in the LAC region, making it the country with the highest emigration rate in the Americas.

According to the data available for 14 countries, the number of Haitians living outside its borders, but within the Latin American and Caribbean region, almost was quadruplicated. In the last decade, displacements have doubled in number of people (from 501,759 to 968,426) and the United States and Canada appear as the main destinations, although their relative importance has decreased compared to Latin America and the Caribbean, a region that increased its share of 13% in 2000, to 33% in 2010.

The main recipient of Haitian emigration is the Dominican Republic: 88% of the migrants who received this country come from Haiti, the majority of men (64%) and 94% of working age. Less than 30% of these have secondary or university education, while in other countries this proportion exceeds 75%, when for Dominican nationals it is slightly above 40% (Zevallos, 2014: 31). The agricultural sector, construction, commerce and other services, are the main employment out-migration opportunities for Haitians, generally under very informal modalities; of the total number of salaried workers, 43% of men and 63% of women had permanent employment, while 39% of the total were casual workers (ILO, 2016: 33-34).

Historically, both Haitian migrants and their descendants played a very important role in the Dominican Republic's economic development as an indispensable workforce of the sugar industry. In the 1970s and 1980s, Haitians went to cover the lack of rural workers for tasks in cane production that had left the exodus to cities or international migration of the Dominican population (Schwarz Coulange Méroné, 2018).

Although the Dominican Constitutions of 1994 and 2002 granted the right to nationality to those born in their national territory (*ius soli*), the 2010 Constitution established that persons born in the Dominican Republic, daughters or sons of non-Dominican parents or who were in an irregular status are not considered Dominican nationals. This amendment to the constitution, in addition to the migration irregularity of several generations of Haitians, led to an increase in the number of stateless children and many Dominican descendants of immigrants,

especially Haitians, to question their nationality and to be on the brink of statelessness, being passed on to the registration of foreigners. "This is a crisis in which four generations of people were legally wiped off the map and turned into ghost citizens without rights or future, without being able to enroll in school or apply for a normal job, and having difficulty seeing a doctor" (Robin Guittard, 2020).

To respond to the many domestic and international claims that this policy of exception and strangeness about people of Haitian descent had been unleashed, the Dominican Republic developed a national regularization plan and a special regime law, which proved of little effectiveness due to the predominant situation of documentation in which Haitians are located, making it difficult to formalize them. In a way, it is a procedure of "naturalization" of Dominican people who were previously removed from Dominican nationalization (Penchaszadeh, 2016).

In June 2017, the Dominican Ministry of the Interior reported that of 249,947 approved files, 244,366 were Haitians. However, CARICOM Heads of Government at their inter-sessional meeting held in February of the same year, noted their concern over the situation of statelessness of Dominicans of Haitian descent and agreed to maintain their defense in regional and international forums (CARICOM, 2017).

On the other hand, the increasing flow from Haiti to South America has as recipient countries, mainly Brazil and Chile, followed by Argentina. Specifically with regard to migration to Brazil, there has been a sharp increase in migration from the 2010 earthquake, and in 2017, it was placed in the fifth largest national group in Brazil. At first, entry into Brazil was mostly by land through unauthorized border crossings, and then applying for refugee status. In 2011, the Brazilian government decided, through National Immigration Council Resolution 08/06 (CNIg), to grant permanent residences on humanitarian grounds to Haitians already in the country. In 2012, it enabled the issuance of humanitarian visas through the Brazilian consulate located in Port-au-Prince, but with a quota of 100 per month, and then also enabled the possibility of processing in Ecuador, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic. This was accompanied by the request for tourist visas by the government of Peru, which is one of the Haitian transit countries to Brazil. Thus, entry into Brazil was difficult and Peruvian-Brazilian border crossings began to require Peruvian visa for entry. Despite the fact that the quota was subsequently eliminated and more points were made available for visa applications, accompanied by the opening of the Peruvian borders, illegal entries through unauthorized crossings increased, generating a health emergency in the Brazilian border cities. The increase in Haitian migration to Brazil is reflected in the jump from 13 people registered as permanent immigrants in 2010 to 10,622 in 2014 (ILO, 2016: 46) and in the fact that, by the end of 2015, 43,871 permanent residence visas will have been authorized for Haitians who had entered and settled in the last four years (GS/OAS-IOM, 2016: 22).

The second receiving country in South America is Chile; the entry begins to be massive after what happened in Brazil; in fact, it is believed that this is due to the change of destination due to the

economic crisis Brazil was going through in 2015. Figures that account for this are: in 2013, there were about 5,000 Haitians in the country, while between 2013 and June 2016, an entrance of 41,065 Haitians was reported (Pedemonte et al. 2015) and, in 2017, more than 100,000 entries. They usually arrive in Chile by air (Santiago de Chile airport). Since 2012, due to the increasing number of Haitians arriving, some extra requirements are being applied informally, such as a letter of invitation and an availability of one thousand dollars to spend, in order to enter to the country. In any case, the entry of Haitians continues to increase, so in 2018 the immigration policy is reformed and they are required to have a 30-day tourist visa and a humanitarian family reunification visa with quotas, which can only be processed from Haiti. This complicates the arrival of Haitians in that country. The only precedent had been, in 2012, a similar requirement for Dominicans.

Starting in 2016 and during 2017, the number of Haitians trying to enter the United States increases, many of them from Brazil, where the country's economic situation begins to make it difficult to stay. The route chosen by Haitian migrant flows is usually across the border from Peru and Ecuador, the same as it was previously to enter Brazil. When in 2016, the same population reused transit through these two countries but now to the north, the impact was no greater as it was a locally known migration flow and they were allowed to pass without major complications by the governments of these countries. However, Haitians subsequently sought to cross Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico. The policies taken by these countries were not the same, starting with Colombia that closed its borders to Haitians justifying the closure that Panama had previously made, which in turn bases that decision on the closure of Costa Rica and Nicaragua. All these difficulties caused illegal crossings and violence to grow at the borders of different states, leading to a government-recognized migration crisis. Particularly the passage through Nicaragua is considered dangerous and violent; the United Nations Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers issued a statement regarding concerns about the human rights of Haitian migrants in that country. Similar measures were taken in Honduras and Guatemala, leaving Haitian migrants passing by, stipulating the time spent in the country, the legally controlling their transit. Mexico's response was similar, they sought to create a safe conduct for the population who intended to reach the United States. This caused a humanitarian crisis on both sides of the border. In Mexico, especially in Tijuana, Haitians overwhelmed the attention span of NGOs who, despite the shelters installed, failed to cope with the number of migrants waiting to cross the border into the northern country. All of this is enhanced by their low chance of entering the United States, due to the restrictions that the United States has been pushing.

In this regard, it is relevant to analyze America's historical relations with Haiti, these have been shaped by an interventionist policy by the United States in Haitian politics. A major influx of Haitian migration to that country can be seen from the 1970s onwards, these forced

political migrations were because of Jean-Claude Duvalier's dictatorship. Between 1972 and 1981, more than

55,000 Haitians arrived in Florida and it is estimated that the actual number should be much higher considering the large percentage of undetected illegal migrations. While the United States took as a policy the interception of vessels for further return to the country of origin, this did not bring down the migratory flow in the following years. Although it was argued that asylum would be granted to Haitians who applied for asylum for legitimate reasons, this does not appear to be true, as approved applications were almost void.

In 1991, the number of asylum orders fell, when Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's first democratically elected president, took power. As this was quickly overthrown by a new military coup, nearly 40,000 Haitians left for the shores of Florida, and the U.S. government had the same response as in earlier times.

In 2010, after the earthquake that virtually destroyed Haiti, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services focused on two interim immigration solutions for Haitians: the offer of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to those who had arrived earlier, and a limited acceptance of requests for parole (humanitarian parole), in order to allow the entry of some earthquake-affected individuals who were inadmissible. However, of the more than 20,000 Haitians evacuated to the US. For the emergency, nearly 1,700 (COHA, op. cit) were granted humanitarian parole. The validity of the TPS has suffered several extensions, the last until January 18, 2018.

In addition, programs for newly arrived Cubans and Haitians (CHEP) and probation for the reunification of Haitian families (HFRP) are in force. CHEP is a federal program, administered by the USCIS, that provides some benefits and services to Cubans and Haitians. Those obtaining parole as a Cuban/Haitian arriver may be benefited from CHEP. Likewise, those who have an application for asylum pending with USCIS or are in out-migration proceedings, if not a final order, are not subject to appeal. The support offered has to do with obtaining housing, basic furniture, food and clothing, as well as guidance and training for employment, within local availability. Other services such as access to English classes and assistance in applying for Social Security cards are also offered on the children's school record. Assistance is provided within 30 to 180 days, depending on whether or not the person has family members or other supporters in the U.S. HFRP65 was created in 2014 and allows certain eligible U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents to apply for parole for their family members in Haiti. Once in the United States, these individuals can apply for work authorization while they are waiting to apply for legal permanent resident status. Also as explained above, in recent years, there has been an increase in the influx of undocumented Haitians on Mexico's border with the United States, bringing the number of unadmitted from that nationality from 334 in 2015, to 6,424 in 2016, and to 9,163 in the first three quarters of 2017.

Policy Responses

On the situation in Haiti, the United Nations Security Council recently recognized that, in order to achieve lasting and sustainable stability, it was necessary to advance the reconstruction of the country and its social and economic development, and reiterated the need for security to be "accompanied by sustainable development in its social, economic and environmental dimensions, including risk reduction and preparedness activities that address the country's extreme vulnerability to natural disasters" (United Nations, 2017: 2).

Two months after the United Nations' pronouncement, in May 2017, representatives of international cooperation agencies, universities and human rights, migrant, and civil society organizations from several countries issued a joint statement to nominate Haiti "as a special country for the Global Migration and Refugee Convention agenda and Haitian Afro-descendants as subjects of special protection in specific cases within the framework of the United Nations International Decade for Afro-descendants (2015-2024).

Review of policy responses vs. Country Challenges

- Need for a joint response from the countries of the region: as developed earlier, each country addressed the issue unilaterally, some treating the humanitarian migration problem as a mere security problem.
- Mexico-U.S. border: thousands of stranded Haitians rejected on entry with a request for humanitarian asylum to the United States, due to the tightening of the latter's immigration policies (there are migrants of multiple nationalities wanting to enter in that crossing point).
- Reconstruction of Haiti post-natural disasters: Haitian migrants continue to leave the country as there are no opportunities or decent life chances in the country; most refugee camps installed years ago continue to function as housing.
- Challenge: issue of stateless people in the Dominican Republic.

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Mexico

Types of Migration Flows

Based on a historical analysis of migration in Mexico, it is pertinent to go back to the beginning of the 19th century. Mexico was a sparsely populated country, a concern that led to a series of laws and decrees aimed at promoting immigration (especially European), as in other countries on the continent, but with less success: only 0.5% of European migrants in the late nineteenth century settled in Mexico. This is attributed to Mexico's political instability and the fact that other countries (such as Argentina) offered better conditions for immigration.

For this reason, Mexico turns to attract Asian immigration and, towards the end of the 19th century, receives Japanese migratory flows. However, these migrations are affected by various factors that end up restricting it. On the one hand, the presence in the United States of anti-Japanese movements and the ban on Chinese immigration in that same country, which caused a forced diversion of Asian immigrants to Mexico, while inviting them to follow the American example; on the other hand, the infectious diseases and epidemics that developed, setting off alarm bells among the population. Hence, the country later adopted more restrictive and selective measures regarding immigration, with particular emphasis on the physical conditions and cultural integration facilities of immigrants.

Towards the 20th century, Mexico was characterized as a host country for refugees from Spain (in Civil War at that time) and from Latin American countries in dictatorship, mainly Chile, Argentina and Uruguay. It also became a refuge for thousands of citizens of Guatemala, a country with which it shares a border. Thus began what would become a Mexican tradition of political asylum for people fleeing religious or ideological persecution in their respective countries, including many artists, intellectuals and scientists. In 1980 the country created the Refugee Assistance Commission.

However, since the mid-20th century, the Mexican migratory phenomenon has been absolutely conditioned by its proximity to the United States, with whom it shares a border of more than 3,000 km. On the one hand, because the migratory flow is practically centered in the United States, favored by events such as the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in force since 1994. But also because it is this country that determines that Mexico is simultaneously a country of immigration, emigration and transmigration, receiving mainly Central American (and to a lesser extent, Latin American and Asian) citizens who cross Mexican lands in an attempt to cross the border into the United States without authorization.

Immigration in Mexico

The INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography) points out that an international immigrant is a person residing in Mexico who was born in another country. According to the 23rd General Population Census (2010), 961,121 Mexican residents

were born abroad, representing less than 1% of the population. However, census estimates do not distinguish between the foreign-born population and the population that is required to complete procedures with the immigration authorities for the children of Mexicans born abroad. It is important to highlight those people who were born in another country and were registered there (mainly USA) but did not live there. Normally, this situation is said to be part of a family strategy to ensure that children born in the United States could have ease of migratory mobility and access to other social security benefits in that country. This situation contributes to increasing the percentage of U.S. born among foreign residents in Mexico: 76.7%, followed far behind by Guatemala and Spain. In fact, most of this 76.7% resides in border areas, mainly Baja California, Chihuahua and Tamaulipas, with Tijuana standing out.

The average age of foreign residents in Mexico is 20 years of age, with those under 20 making up 65% of the total. The difference between male and female is irrelevant in numerical terms. The population in the status of aliens has higher levels of schooling than those of Mexican descent, who are also younger on average. An eye-catching portion of U.S.-born residents of alien status contributes to the economically inactive part of the population, this responds to American retirees who then settle in Mexico.

Mexican emigrants in the U.S.

According to the statistics of the Government of Mexico of "Mexican Population in the World 2017", prepared with the information provided by the diplomatic and consular representations of Mexico, there are 11,848,537 Mexican people residing abroad, of which 97.23% are based in the United States. These data are similar to those recorded in the Yearbook of Migration and Remittances Mexico 2017 (document submitted by BBVA, prepared in collaboration with CONAPO) that states that in 2016 Mexico was the second most migrant country in the world (12.3 million people, representing about 9% of its total population), of which only 2% did not reside in the United States. In recent years, U.S. immigration policy has escalated, becoming more aggressive towards the continent's Spanish-speaking population. In the Yearbook of Migration and Remittances Mexico 2019, it is distinguished between Mexican migrants returned from the USA and Mexican migrants removed from the USA, the first being those voluntarily returned under some program and the latter, those expelled in court. This document reveals that in 2017, 74.6% of that population was removed, while only 25.4% were returned.

The phenomenon of transmigration

2014 was the first year in history in which Central American immigration to the U.S. surpassed Mexican immigration. This is not only the product of a downward trend in Mexican immigration in the U.S. since 2007-2008 (due to the economic crisis and lack of employment in the northern neighbor), but rather the huge increase in the century.

in Central American migration to the U.S. that has also had an effect on Mexico's southern border and has transformed it since the late 20th century.

These changes have been accompanied by a growing presence of organized crime groups on the migration routes of southern Mexico. A little-guarded border - partly due to its hard-to-reach geography, such as forests and rainforests - southern Mexico is a common route of illegal crossing for undocumented immigrants, mainly from the North Triangle of Central America ("Triángulo Norte de Centroamérica" or "TNC"): Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. Initially, migrant trafficking was carried out by so-called "polleros". In recent years, they were substituted by drug cartels. In general terms, migration in transit takes place in contexts of high risk to its members: lack of resources, the danger of routes, the means of transport used, human trafficking and other criminal actuators. This is compounded by the fact that they usually lack the necessary documentation to enter the destination countries, so they seek to go unnoticed by governments, leaving their rights at an even greater risk of being violent. Recently, the migrant "caravans" that connect the five points of entry to Mexico on the southern border and the three points of entry to the United States on the northern border, are becoming one of the most common forms adopted by Central Americans to migrate to the United States and present some novelties and new challenges with respect to the classic form of transit: they travel in large groups, which seek to attract media attention and authorities, with knowledge of the routes.

The undocumented Central American migrant population transiting through Mexican territory to the United States accounts for the highest percentage of those who were apprehended and repatriated by Mexico and the United States. In 2018, 96% of the population repatriated by the Mexican authorities was TNC people, while in 2016, 43.7% of total apprehensions in the US were held by the U.S. was from people coming from TNC countries.

According to the Migration and Remittances Yearbook Mexico 2019, the people apprehended in the United States who migrate through Mexico are mostly men, under 35 years old, single and with different levels of schooling (depending on the country of origin). More than 60% used a "pollero" for the crossing, paying more than \$4000. The main reasons for migration are lack of employment or economic crisis, low income or poor working conditions, violence or insecurity in their country of origin.

From 2010 to 2018, the proportion of unaccompanied Mexican migrant children and adolescents repatriated increased from 67% to 88.5%, this worrisome situation has required the United States and Mexico to develop policies and allocate resources for this population. From 2017 to 2018, assisted returns of migrant children and adolescents by Mexican authorities increased from 16,751 events to 25,688.

As previously mentioned, the migratory phenomenon in Mexico is conditioned by its proximity to the United States. This means that each decision in terms of immigration policy adopted by the United States will have a direct influence on the migratory flows that Mexico will have to face. Restrictive stances

adopted by the U.S. have resulted in numerous migrants transforming Mexico into their destination. This same yearbook states that from 2013 to 2018 the number of applicants for refugee status in Mexico increased almost thirteen times, from 1,296 to 17,116.

Policy Responses

Having presented the characteristics of the migratory phenomenon in Mexico, it can be stated that until the beginning of the 21st century, Mexican public migratory policy was primarily focused on emigration and aimed at protecting its emigrants (fundamentally in the United States) and at enabling them to enjoy better conditions. It currently faces huge challenges from irregular transit migration.

Legal/Rights framework sustaining the policies/programs

Mexico has a Law on Refugees, Complementary Protection and Political Asylum. The State reaffirmed its commitment to the protection of refugee applicants in the 2014 Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action, the Declaration of Action of San José of July 2016, and within the framework of the Summit of Leaders on Refugees held at the 71st session of the UN General Assembly. This resulted in the adoption of 39 specific commitments to strengthen refugee protection in the Comprehensive Framework for Protection responses and solutions adopted in October 2017 together with five countries in the region, as a regional contribution to the Global Compact on Refugees.

Among the most important advances in the legislative field is the constitutional reform of human rights, the reform of the General Law on Migration of 2009 - which ceased to consider as a crime the irregular transit of people through Mexico - and the promulgation in 2012 of the Migration Act, which establishes the principles and rights of migrants regardless of their immigration status.

Types of programs/interventions implemented or in process

On public policy, for the first time in Mexico, the National Development Plan ordered the development of a specific program in this area: the National Migration Program, which establishes strategic lines of care for migrants from an approach to respect and promotion of human rights.

Despite the insistence of the U.S. government administration, the Foreign Secretary has stated that Mexico does not have a "Safe Third Country" agreement with the United States. If any, the Mexican state would be required to provide protection and long-term, legal permanence, to all those who had been rejected in the United States and qualified as refugees, in addition to providing access to health, education, basic services and offering legal guarantees against arbitrary detention. That is why the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations argues that Mexico does not meet the requirements of international standards to become a Safe Third Country.

Review of policy responses vs. Country Challenges

In relation to Mexican emigration, one of the main challenges that Mexican governments have faced and persists to this day, is to find a way for Mexicans who decide to work abroad to do so legally and to attend to the economic and social reintegration of the increasingly Mexican migrants repatriated from the United States. As for irregular migration in transit, some of the priority issues on the Mexican migration agenda are the alarming uptick in the number of unaccompanied minors and the guarantee of public servants' respect for the rights of migrants that must be respected as indicated by the Constitution, the Migration Act and the international commitments made by Mexico.

While the human rights perspective goes through the initiatives and positions of the Mexican State, it still owes its translation into more effective political practices.

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
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Venezuela

Types of Migration Flows

Historically, the country was one of the region's most attractive centers for immigrants, both to Latin American countries and to traditional European overseas countries: Spain, Italy and Portugal. This was reflected in a sustained increase in immigrants since the 1950s, peaking in the 1980s when it surpassed one million. Later, a slight, but maintained reduction took place, until year 2001. However, there is a clear process in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela of mortality, re-migration and return of nationals of those South American countries that had once increased the volume of immigrants, who established themselves mainly motivated by employment opportunities at a time of economic

expansion based on oil exploitation.

The 1981 Population and Housing Census listed a total of 1,074,629 foreign-born residents, decreasing to 1,015,538 for the 2001 census (ECLAC, 2016). As a hypothesis, it can be pointed out that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela presents a peculiar migratory circumstance that can be called "immigration replacement", where the structure of origin of those born abroad is changing and, of course, the proportions of them. This circumstance, along with the emigration of the last decade, is a field of much debate (De la Vega y Vargas, 2014; Panadés, 2011). In the country, a certain pattern in permanence and return seems to be outlined. Those who remain and grow are immigrants from countries that today have an affinity to the development model that the country currently carries out as the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Cuba. In the case of Haiti, the Venezuelan government has shown solidarity with the needs of the Haitian people, which results in openness and support for immigration.

Moreover, the 2010 census data show that, over the past ten years, it has undergone an important emigration process that stands out for its relative growth. In the total number of countries with information to date, the figure amounts to more than

80,000 Venezuelans abroad and it can be added that there are 185,000 and 155,000 in the United States and Spain (Martínez Pizarro, Cano and Soffia, 2014).

According to data from the World Bank and the United Nations Global Migration Database, between 2005 and 2010, the number of Venezuelans living abroad in recent decades has

grown significantly, going from 378,000 to 521,000 (Freitez, 2011).

Where are these migrants headed within the region? The countries in the region with the largest relative increases in the number of Venezuelans are, in order of importance, Panama - which in one decade has multiplied by more than six times the total number of Venezuelan residents - Colombia, Mexico, Costa Rica and Argentina.

The advantages of being a neighboring country and the potential job opportunities explain the intense increase observed in Panama and Colombia. The probable existence of networks could explain emigration to other countries. Flows to the United States, Canada and Spain showed moderate to high increases, such as Spain, where their numbers doubled over a decade. In the latter, the factors that contributed to achieving this increase are: sharing the same language, cultural proximity as well as the fact that a good part of Venezuelans -the highest proportion among Latin Americans- has Spanish nationality and, therefore, can access the community passport (Freitez, 2011; Martínez Pizarro, Cano and Soffia, 2014). The profile of Venezuelans arriving in Spain is a young population, qualified, with undergraduate and even postgraduate studies, as well as professional entrepreneurs (Castillo Crasto and Reguant Alvarez, 2017).

For decades, the United States has been another of the destinations chosen by Venezuelans. The moderate increase in that country suggests greater diversification of recipient countries, including Spain and Portugal in Europe, and Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Chile in Latin America (Freitez, 2011). The gender composition of Venezuelan migration shows a predominance of females. This characteristic can be associated with the marital situation of the migrant (whether he or she migrates in a couple or not) and the activity that he or she seeks to carry out in the place of destination, where educational and labor factors have an important weight.

Currently, the political and socio-economic situation that the country is going through led to three million people leaving Venezuela, and not only neighboring countries were the chosen destinations, but also other more distant Latin American nations. The exodus of Venezuelans is classified as the largest in the modern history of Latin America and the Caribbean, and involves both refugees and migrants.

According to official government figures, the number of Venezuelans in Latin American countries increased from 700,000 in 2015, to more than three million in November 2018. However, international organizations estimate that the amount is higher, since most statistical sources do not take into account Venezuelans in an irregular situation. The International Migrations Organization (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees -UNHCR- (R4V, 2019) estimate that, as of March 2019, the total number of refugees and migrants could amount to 3.7 million. The bulk of this population is concentrated in Colombia and Peru (32.4% and 19.7%, respectively).

Colombia, since it shares borders with Venezuela, is one of the countries where Venezuelan migrants arrive more easily. It is estimated that, until December 2019, more than one million seven hundred immigrants of Venezuelan origin were based in Colombia,

of which -according to Colombian Migration- around a million did not have a regular status. This migration process has had a relevant impact on the Colombian health system, the labor market and the demand for housing, among others. But one of the most important and far-reaching effects is security, since border areas are the main areas affected by the arrival of a large number of people who arrive in conditions of great vulnerability (López Díaz, 2019).

Likewise, it is estimated that more than 800,000 Venezuelans reside in Peru, most of them of working age and with an educational level higher than the average of the Peruvian population. Lima is the chosen settlement center.

The deterioration in macroeconomic indicators resulted in a large increase in poverty in Venezuela, which in 2014 climbed from 48% to 82% of households. A study on the arrival of Venezuelans to Chile (Central Santiago) shows a socio-demographic profile similar to that observed in countries such as Spain and Colombia (young, single and without children) but with differences in terms of the predominant educational level, since in addition to university students, there are technicians and individuals who did not complete their secondary education. On the other hand, labor insertion in Chile is unrelated to academic training, with a predominance of occupations such as sales representatives or waiters (Salgado Bustillos et al, 2018).

Meanwhile, Argentina has been another of Venezuela's favorite destinations in recent years. As of 2016, the number of applications for settling in the country has increased significantly and, between 2017 and 2018, 100,000 applications for temporary residence of Venezuelans were processed in this country.

Policy Responses

Before the political and social crisis in Venezuela deepened, many Latin American countries had had immigration legislation for several years that allowed the entry and regularization of Venezuelans, as is the case of Argentina and other countries that participate in the Agreement on Residence for Nationals of the States Members of Mercosur. Meanwhile Colombia and Peru put in place temporary permits of permanence (of different characteristics and scope) to regularize residence and authorize work permits for Venezuelan people. Ecuador, Brazil and Chile also established various immigration standards to regulate income and stay.

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the fiscal impact and develop national response plans. These institutions also contemplate the use of specific financial services to support the governments.

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